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HEADQUARTERS  
6TH BATTALION, 56TH ARTILLERY  
APO 96491

AVGHFC

3 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 July 1967. (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) UIC WAVATO

TO: Commanding Officer  
97th Artillery Group (AD)  
APO 96307

1. (U) In compliance with AR 1-19 and USARV Regulation 870-2, subject report is submitted.

2. (U) Organization for Mission:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COMMANDERS</u>
6th Bn, 56th Arty	LTC Peter B. Farrell (5 September 1966 - )
Hq and Hq Btry	CPT Edward D. Foust (1 January 1967 - 30 June 1967) CPT James E. Sorenson (1 July 1967 - )
Battery A	CPT Jerry L. Kintigh (2 October 1966 - 10 July 1967) CPT John G. Williamson (11 July 1967 - )
Battery B	CPT John H. Little (14 September 1966 - 9 June 1967) CPT Leroy Woods (10 June 1967 - )
Battery C	CPT Raymond M. Jones (1 February 1967 - )
Battery D	CPT Paul F. Hagerty (23 August 1966 - 9 June 1967) CPT Richard A. Thomas (10 June 1967 - )

DOWNGRADED AT 2 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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C-914-67  
CY 4 08 1967

Authority NNP 974345  
 By MW NARA Date 09/26/03

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3 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
 31 July 1967. (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) UIC WAW1TO

## SECTION I: (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

## 1. (C) GENERAL:

a. The battalion continued the assigned mission of providing combat ready U.S. Army Air Defense units in the defense of assigned areas, Republic of Vietnam.

b. It is significant to note that four of five subordinate units have changed commanders during the reporting period. The transition was effected with no degradation of capabilities to accomplish our mission.

c. Savings Bond participation is at 90.6% of the assigned strength.

d. The main Civic Action activity continues in the Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province. A VC attack on Ben Sang, the primary target area of the Battalion Civic Action Program, resulted in the death of the district U.S. OCO representative, the District Chief, his wife and four ARVN soldiers. This caused little or no regression in the pacification program. Work was completed on a series of bridges allowing Lambretta traffic to transit the hamlet of Ben Sang, thus providing the villagers with a better opportunity for the import-export of products. While this major activity is supported by equipment and personnel resources of all units of the battalion, Battery A has distributed over 25,000 pounds of food in the villages of Don Tang and Tan Thoi (Hoc Mon sub-sector). Battery A medical personnel treated minor ailments of 150-200 indigenous personnel each week during the reporting period, and completed coordination for treatment of more serious ailments at ARVN medical installations.

## e. Distinguished visitors were:

<u>VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
MG Eiffler	CG, 1st Log Cmd	31 May 1967
COL Coe	CO, TSN AB, RVN	3 July 1967
COL Williams	Vice Cmdr, TSN AB, RVN	3 July 1967
BG Young	G3, P&O, USARV	26 July 1967

## 2. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. During the quarter this organization had an average total assigned strength of 1013 personnel. The total authorized strength is 858 (40 officers, 15 warrant officers, 803 enlisted men). There were 313 losses and 288 gains. There are no significant trained mechanic or technician shortages.

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b. Critical MOS Shortages:

MCS	TITLE	AUG	ACT	MAY	LOSSES	
					JUNE	JULY
91B	Medical Specialist	12	8	0	0	1
94A	Food Service Apprentice	5	2	0	0	0
94B	Cook	28	29	3	2	2
95B	Security Guards	65	52	12	8	4

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Emphasis on timely receipt of current intelligence reports have enhanced this organization's ability to prepare for and react to enemy ground/air-mortar capabilities. The following improvements have been made in the collection and dissemination of intelligence information.

(1) Collections: Daily receipt of reports and liaison visits to the following intelligence sources have been initiated:

SOURCE	TYPE OF REPORT
II Field Force	Friendly Situation Report, Intelligence Summary, Incident Reports
98th Advisor Sq	Intelligence and Incident Summaries
USARV	Operation and Incident Reports

In addition to the collection of the above reports on a daily basis, this organization receives weekly and quarterly reports from USARV, MACV, II FFV and III Vietnam Corps. Liaison visits are made periodically to Advisor Team 100, The Mon Sub Sector, Advisor Team 74, Quang Trung Training Center, Capital Military District, and Dong Hai Sensitive Area.

(2) Dissemination:

(a) Spot reports: An approved spot report system has been initiated with immediate distribution to all units in this command.

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31 July 1967. (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) UIC WAVLTC

(b) This organization compiles weekly intelligence summaries for 97th Artillery Group (AD).

b. Physical Security: This is considered adequate. Units are continuing to improve their active and passive defensive measures. Emphasis has been placed on passive defense measures against air/mortar attacks. The following defensive measures have been taken:

- (1) Construction and improvement of guard bunkers with overhead cover.
- (2) Construction of tanglefoot fence inside critical unit perimeter area.
- (3) Permanent emplacement of Claymore mines in concrete.
- (4) Construction of personnel bunkers in administrative area to provide protection against mortar fire.
- (5) Continued installation and improvement of perimeter lighting.
- (6) Improvement of personnel bunkers in billeting areas to provide protection against mortar fire.

(7) Continued emphasis has been placed in the Battalion Sentry Dog Program. Battery D has completed the training facility and the new kennels are nearing completion. Continued emphasis has been placed on the adequate training and proper utilization of the sentry dogs to improve the early detection of intruders. Sentry dog teams at Battery A, Battery B and Headquarters Battery are working outside the perimeter fencing to increase the detection range and to prevent the dogs from becoming familiar with personnel other than the handlers.

c. The battalion has encountered no problems in obtaining necessary security clearances. During the reporting period, the battalion granted 48 Confidential clearances, validated 177 Secret clearances and 25 Top Secret security clearances.

4. (U) OPERATIONS:

a. Group level HEMK Runs and daily battalion air defense exercises have continued to be effective in maintaining a high state of unit training.

b. Tactical SOP examinations were administered to 18 officers and 27 enlisted men, resulting in the qualification for air defense tactical duties of 18 officers and 13 enlisted men.

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AVGHFC 3 August 1967  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 July 1967. (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) UIC WAVITO

c. Continued emphasis has been placed on the capability of the firing batteries to remain operational and adhere to the State of Alert schedule. The preventive maintenance program again produced outstanding results as the battalion operational time was 99.98% for the quarter.

d. All four firing batteries were rated as Combat Ready for the Combat Readiness Evaluations administered by USARPAC during May 1967.

5. (U) LOGISTICS:

a. Logistical Support: Logistical support has improved during report period, for example, QM laundry for sheets, pillowcases and mattress covers. The Self Service Supply Center at Long Binh Post has added several items to its stockage list.

b. Tactical Vehicles: All shortages of  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks have been filled. The only significant shortage of tactical vehicles is the shortage of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks. Stocks due in-country within the next quarter and several that have been located for lateral transfer should reduce this shortage significantly within the next few months.

c. Repair Parts (HAWK):

(1) During this period, the following requisitions were received and processed as follows:

	<u>02</u>	<u>05</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
NUMBER PASSED TO 79TH	418	1541	1883	3342

(2) The Technical Supply Section now carries 14,200 line items, of which 291 are at zero balance. There have been 4710 requisitions, of which 3703 matched our stockage list. The Demand Accomodation is 79%. Out of the 3703 requests that matched our stockage list, we issued 2597 from our stocks. The Demand Satisfaction is 70%. We have had 960 Direct Exchange transactions during the quarter.

d. Maintenance:

(1) General:

(a) Vehicle Deadline Rate: The deadline rate for vehicles during the reporting period was 2.23%. The deadline rate for scoop loaders was 32.25%, compared to 50.5% for the last quarter.

(b) Maintenance Problem Encountered: There is a shortage of trained personnel. OJT personnel cannot do the job of an experienced, trained mechanic. The personnel section is presently trying to locate trained mech-

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Authority **NNP 974345**  
 By **NW** NARA Date **08/21/03**

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AVGWFEC

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
 31 July 1967. (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) UIC WAV1TO

Discussion: 1. This unit had four Claymore mines accidentally detonated by lightning resulting in two fatalities to friendly personnel. The mines were located on the perimeter of Battery A and were wired in series of five mines with the lead wires in a detonation control bunker where they were affixed to a wooden terminal board. Each of the mines were encased in cement blocks and anchored by four perforated steel plank posts. The blasting caps were installed so that they could be command detonated. There were no electrical producing devices connected to or around the lead wires at the time of the accident. An investigation of the incident revealed three possible theories as to how the mines were detonated by the lightning.

2. Following is a synopsis of each theory:

a. The lightning struck a perimeter light pole and electricity followed a telephone line to the bunker and arced across the lead wires or the lightning struck one of the lead wires and followed the lead wire back to the coner where the electricity arced across to four of the five Claymore lead wires.

b. The lightning struck the concertina wire of the inner perimeter fence and then traveled along the concertina and arced over to the lead wires which were lying under the concertina.


c. That the bolt of lightning saturated the area surrounding the detonated Claymores with electricity and the electricity passed through the wet ground to the steel PSP support rods in the Claymore concrete molds. The surge of power was then transferred to the lead wires which were wrapped around the steel PSP and detonated the mines.

3. None of the above theories could be proven or disproven conclusively.

Observation: That all Claymore mines in the future be emplaced so that the blasting caps can be easily removed during lightning storms. Also that they be emplaced so that none of the lead wires are connected to any material which will readily conduct an electrical current.

(U) Part II: Recommendations:

None

  
 PETER B. FARRELL  
 LTC, Arty  
 Commanding

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Authority **NNP974345**  
By **W** NARA Date **08/21/03**

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AVGH-C (3 Aug 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period 1 May 1967  
to 31 July 1967. (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) UIC WAVLTO

HEADQUARTERS, 97TH ARTILLERY GROUP (AD), APO 96307, 21 August 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC  
APO 96375.

1. (U) This headquarters concurs with the report contained in the basic correspondence with the exception of paragraph 4d.

2. (U) One battery was rated Combat Ready and three batteries were rated Limited Combat Ready for the Combat Readiness Evaluations administered by USARPAC during May 1967. A Limited Combat Ready battery is defined as a battery that cannot meet the criteria established for a Combat Ready battery, but does have a limited capability to engage hostile airborne targets.



J. C. FIMIANI  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

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DECLASSIFICATION  
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Authority **NNP 974345**  
NW *relation*

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**AVISO-DEF (3 Aug 67) 2d Ind**  
**SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1967 (AOS CDFOR-65) (U)**

**HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 9 SEP 1967**

**TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CDFOR-65, APO 96375**

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery (NAVITO) as indicated.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning detonation of chlorine mine by lightning, Section II, Part II, Page 6; Memorandum. Attention is invited to DA 9-3345-200, 8 Jan 1964, as changed. Two pertinent comments are: (1) **NOTE:** Position the mine so that friendly troops cannot get to the side of the mine (Fig 20 and 21) will not be endangered. The firing position should be at least 10 meters to the rear or to the side of the mine; and (2) **NOTE:** M 161 mines should be prepared for non electric detonation when mines are to be deployed in such a way that they would be a danger to friendly troops if spontaneously detonated during electrical storms. Refer to paragraph 2h and figure 23(A)."

b. Reference item concerning operations, Paragraph 4d and Paragraph 2, 1st Indovement: Concur with para 2, 1st Indovement. The discrepancy between the ORLL and the 1st indovement was a matter of interpretation. The unit felt that as long as one missile in the unit was capable of reaching a target it was combat ready; the overall effectiveness of the unit is what but is still capable of killing a target. **NOTE:** (2) **NOTE:** The position steps to insure proper interpretation of **COMBAT READY** and in the readiness inspection.

3. (U) Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine indovement which returns this report.

**FOR THE COMMANDER:**

**E. L. KENNEDY**  
Cpt. AGC  
Ass Adjutant General

**MFR: ORLL was staffed through;**

**G3 Opns CPT Harrison/4749**  
**G4 LTC Penny/4279**

**ACTION OFFICER: MAJ BARK**

**GROUP 4**

Downgraded at 3 year interval  
Declassified after 12 years  
DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies

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CH	
DST	
DIV	✓
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*Dispatched 18 SEP 1967*

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**DISPOSITION FORM**

(AR 340-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT		
AVHGC-0	ORLL for 6th Bn, 56th Arty		
TO	FROM	DATE	CMT 1
G3, DS&T	Chief, Opn Div, G3	11 SEP 1967 CPT Harrison/cjd/4749	

Comments concerning subject ORLL for 6th Bn, 56th Arty are forwarded as requested:

Para 4d and para 2, 1st Ind: Concur with para 2, 1st Ind. The discrepancy between the ORLL and the 1st indorsement was a matter of interpretation. The unit felt that as long as one missile in the unit was capable of engaging a target it was combat ready; the overall effectiveness of the unit is limited but is still capable of killing a target. Ninety-seventh Group (AD) has taken positive steps to insure proper interpretation of terminology used in the readiness inspection.

WILLIAM E. SCANLON  
Colonel, GS  
Chief Operations Division  
Office, ACofS, G3

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AVHGD-PO

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lesson Learned (ORLL)

TO: G3DST

FROM: G4

DATE:

8 SEP 1967 GMT 2  
LTC Penny/jd/LB4279

Reference item concerning detonation of claymore mines by lightning, section II, Part II, Page 6: Nonconcur. Attention is invited to TM 9-1345-200, 8 June 1964, as changed. Two pertinent extracts are: (1) "WARNING: Position the mine so that friendly troops forward and to the side of the mine (fig 20 & 21) will not be endangered. The firing position should be at least 16 meters to the rear or to the sides of the mine."; and (2) "WARNING: M 18A1 mines should be prepared for non electric detonation when mines are to be deployed in such a way that they would be a danger to friendly troops if spontaneously detonated during electrical storms. Refer to paragraph 20h and figure 23(A)."

2 Incl  
nc

*James P. Johnson, LTC, GS*  
H. B. BOYLE, JR  
Colonel, GS  
ACofS, G4

Authority **NNP 974345**  
By **MN** NARA Date **08/21/03**

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AVHOC-DST (13 Aug 67) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1967 (GCS GSPOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: G-3, APO 96558

7 NOV 1967

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Artillery Group (AAGD) as interested.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning XI-4 Speech Security Device, page 8, paragraph 4. Concur in the action taken by the Commander. Problem area is scheduled for discussion at the next conference concerning cryptographic logistics.

b. Reference item concerning publications, page 10, paragraph 5b: The need for pertinent MACV and USAFV directives for units deploying to Vietnam was recognized during the early stages of the buildup in Vietnam. In April 1966, this headquarters began mailing publication packets (USAFV and pertinent MACV directives) to COMUS based upon units scheduled for deployment. It appears that this unit did not receive an advance packet; however, current regulations were immediately available on receipt upon arrival in-country. With regard to the statement that 25 percent were missing from packets, this could have been an isolated instance. This headquarters is investigating the allegation since all packets are standard and contain the most current USAFV publications. Further, the Adjutant General maintains a schedule of staff visits specifically to assist units in securing publications, since experience has proven that the majority of problems are the result of unfamiliarity with requisitioning procedures.

c. Reference item concerning 8-1 personnel section, page 11, paragraph 7b: Concur except for publications being provided incoming units. Units should have DA directives prior to deploying from COMUS and should have received USAFV and pertinent MACV directives prior to deployment. Blank forms are available to sponsoring units.

JOHN R. MEISSNER  
Major, Infantry

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GROUP 4

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Declassified after 12 years  
300 DFR 5200.10 Applies

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Authority NNP 974345  
By M NARA Date 09/21/03

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AVHQC-DST (13 Aug 67) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1967 (ROB ODPOR-65) (U)

d. Reference item concerning publication distribution, page 11, paragraph 8: Nonconcur. Procedures are already established in AR 310-1 and USARV Regulation 310-3 to provide for timely and adequate distribution of publications. However, it should be emphasized that commanders must take actions to establish accounts with publications centers in COMUS and the Printing and Publications Center, Japan for supply or resupply of publications and blank forms support.

3. (U) A copy of this intercomm will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

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MFR: ORLL was staffed through:

GI LTC Ceglowski/4278  
C-E LTC Castillo/4632  
AG MAJ Byrd/4408  
*PAR 26 modified by coordination with BARK-LTC Ceglowski*  
ACTION OFFICER: MAJOR BARK

CH DST DIV	1
CH MS BR	
CH DOCT BR	BR 7 Nov
CH TWG BR	
CH S/O	B

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