Training for Future Wars

“Everyone wants to be in charge, but no one wants to lead” John A. Mayfield, US Army, SFC

Incorporating the lessons of World War II, the origins of today’s air control system are found in FM 31-35, Air Ground Operations, published in August 1946, prior to an independent Air Force. FM 31-35 set up procedures for close air support, creating the two parallel systems. They were the Air Ground Operations System and the Tactical Air Control System. This parallel structure was joined at the top with the “Joint Operations Center where both air and ground intelligence officers worked together to coordinate air support to ground units.

The shortcomings of such a system were eventually recognized and the services, especially the Army and the Air Force worked to solve them. By the beginning of 1965, a unified tactical control system did not yet exist. Although steps were taken to improve the situation. In June 1962 the United States Strike Command began tests to devise means to facilitate air support. After four United States Strategic Command (USSTRICOM) joint exercises (Three Pairs, Coulee Crest, Swift Strike III, and Desert Strike), the "Concept for Improved Joint Air-Ground Coordination” was signed by the Air Force Chief of Staff Gen John P. McConnell on 19 March and Army Chief of Staff Gen Harold K. Johnson on 28 April 1965. Between August 24 and September 22, 1964, the Army and Air Force conducted an exercise called Indian Summer III. In this exercise the Air Force experimented with various methods to solve the “Army’s perennial complaint that the Tactical Air Control System was not mobile enough to keep up with a rapidly advancing ground force.”

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 (31 December 1958) and further guidance in Publication 2 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1959, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff reached a controversial agreement. This so-called Decker/LeMay agreement was the basis for Publication 8 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1964, Doctrine for Air Defense From Overseas Land Areas.

Publication 8, which has not been amended or changed since 1964, remains the cornerstone document upon which integrated air defense (IAD) doctrine is based. The organization for joint air defense operations is doctrinally established in this publication to provide for "centralized direction and maximum decentralized authority to engage hostile aircraft." The centralized commander would normally be an Air Force commander.

These exercises proved conclusively that the new system was vastly superior to the old. The concept was officially approved by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force in early 1965 and was used in Vietnam with great success.

a.       Exercise Three Pairs - Joint Army/Air Force exercise, Fort Hood, TX 1962. The joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed Commander in Chief, United States Strike Forces (CINCSTRIKE) to withdraw Army and Air Force units involved in Exercise Three Pairs which were needed for Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) OpPlans 312, 314, and 316 (Cuban Missile Crisis)

b.      Exercise Coulee Crest – was a United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM) Joint Exercise conducted in May 1963 in the vicinity of Yakima, Washington, which emphasized assault airlift operations.

c.       Exercise Swift Strike III, July 21 – August 16, 1963 – Each year the XVII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC held huge maneuvers called Operation Swift Strike. Swift Strike III, held in 1963, had a maneuver area that encompassed almost all of Dixie, and the primary purpose of the exercise was to ascertain whether Army or Air Force aviation was more conducive to the movement of large bodies of troops in a battlefield setting.

By the time Swift Strike III was over, aerial-resupply and troop movement procedures had been hatched that would form the basis of all such procures in future Airborne/airmobile operations. The Army lost its battle for an air arm. The final result of the test was that while the Army would control the small, tactical choppers, to be used for small-unit troop movement and command and control. The US Air Force would take over the Caribous, as well as all other choppers save the Chinook, which the Army got to move its artillery.

d.      Desert Strike May 1964- Was a joint Army-Air Force exercise designed to familiarize troops with the concepts and doctrine associated with the large scale employment of conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. Joint Exercise Desert Strike was the biggest U.S. desert warfare maneuver since General George Patton trained his tank forces in the same area in 1942 to prepare for the invasion of North Africa.

The exercise involved more than 100,000 men (90,000 Army, 10,000 Air Force), 780 aircraft, 7,000 wheeled vehicles, 1,000 tanks. All were deployed over some 13 million acres of California, Nevada and Arizona landscape. Air Force units operated out of 25 airfield from Texas to Oregon.

The men of the 6^th Missile Battalion, 56^th Artillery displayed to the world the unit’s mobility and the awesome capability of the Battalion’s HAWK air defense capability.

Because of the outstanding performance of U.S. Army HAWK missile units like the 6^th Missile Battalion, 56^th Artillery during Operation Desert Strike, some Airmen concluded that aircraft could not operate in an surface to air missile (SAM) protected area. It should be noted that the HAWK missile system was a more capable SAM than the SA-2. (SA-2 Soviet surface-to-air-missile used by North Vietnam)

An Air Threat Emerges

In August 1964 following a buildup of Chinese Communist air strength in South China and in the North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) an enemy air threat emerges.

North Vietnam received its first fighter aircraft, the MiG-17 in February 1964, but they first arrived at air bases in Communist China, where the pilots were trained. On February 3, 1964, the first fighter regiment No. 921 "Sao Do" was formed (Trung Ðoàn Không Quân Tiêm Kích 921), and on August 6 it arrived from Communist China in North Vietnam with its MiG-17s. On September 7, the No. 923 fighter regiment "Yen The", led by Lt. Binh Bui, was formed. In May 1965, No. 929 bomber squadron (Ð?i Ð?i Không Quân Ném Bom 929) was formed with Il-28 twin engine bombers.

North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) pilots had been going to the USSR since 1959 at a rate of about forty per annum. They had been sent to Krasnodar to participate in a five-year training program in either the MiG-17, single-engine fighter or the IL-28 (BEAGLE) light bomber aircraft. The Soviet fighter training program emphasized basic flight and engineering up to complex.

Soviet willingness to furnish the NVA IL-28 Beagles Light Bombers

 Cuba and the IL-28 Beagle 

Vietnam was not the first time that the United States had to confront the Soviet IL-28 Beagle. For practical purposes, military operations for the Cuban crisis began with the US discovery of Soviet IL-28 medium bombers in Cuba on 30 September 1962, and ended with the Soviet Union’s announcement on 19 November 1962 that those aircraft would be withdrawn. Only then did President Kennedy end the quarantine and allow the Defense Department to relax.

During the Cuban Missile crisis the 6th Battalion (HAWK), 65th Air Defense Artillery were deployed to Key West, Florida, just 90 miles from Cuba. The men of the HAWK missile battalion became the front line in protecting our United States cities from direct air attack from Cuba.

Constant High Level of Air Defense Alert

What the North Vietnamese were able to do in Vietnam with the eight IL-28 Beagles Light Bombers that the Soviet’s furnished them was, require the United States to maintain a constant high level of air defense alert, as far south as Saigon in Vietnam and U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Base in Thailand. 

US Massive Increase in Air Strikes 

In 1965 the US massively increased the scale of its air strike operations against North Vietnam, and in response the North Vietnamese deployed Il-28 bomber aircraft and had the potential for the first time to strike allied forces in South Vietnam as far south as Saigon and in north-east Thailand.  The heightened air threat from North Vietnam and the lack of allied low altitude radar coverage in the region meant that if the enemy chose to exploit this weakness it was estimated that the bases in South Vietnam and north-east Thailand would be open to attack.

Could Trigger a Holocaust

Given the closely parked, unrevetted aircraft and their proximity to ordnance and fuel storage, even one or two enemy aircraft alone could have triggered a holocaust under then prevailing airfield conditions. Because command and control, radar and communications systems were equally vulnerable, the creation of an adequate air defense system became a matter of urgency for the allies in 1965 and thereafter.

And with the massive deployments of U.S. forces, all of the ports and adjacent supply dumps in South Vietnam were congested and highly vulnerable to air attacks by Il-28s. We could not afford to ignore the growing capability of the North Vietnamese Air Force to mount attacks against our aircraft and these points of concentration.

Round The-Clock Air Defense Alert

During 1965, round-the-clock air defense alert was maintained by 12 F-102 interceptors at Tan Son Nhut near Saigon, at Don Muang near Bangkok and during daylight hours by 79^th Squadron at Ubon. By the end of 1966, Allied air forces on air defense alert had grown significantly both in South Vietnam and Thailand with four F-102s at Udorn, two F-102s at Don Muang on five-minute alert, and 79th Squadron with two aircraft on five-minute alert during daylight hours to cover north-east Thailand, not just for the Ubon air base. The 79^th Squadron thus was part of an integrated air defense system that covered all of north-east Thailand against an identified enemy air threat from North Vietnam

Possible IL-28 Bomber Attack on DaNang

In October 1965 when intelligence reports indicated a possible IL-28 bomber attack on Da Nang. The second and possibly most serious threat of the entire war took place early in February 1968 when 4 IL-28's and 13 MIG's penetrated the DMZ. Upon entering the zone, the fighter escort broke off, some turning Laotian border, the remainder flying out to sea. The four Beagles loitered in the DMZ for almost an hour, and when locked on by an Army HAWK missile battery they departed the area. The third incident came in mid June 1968, when an enemy helicopter threat appeared to be building up along the DMZ.

HAWK's At STATE 1 Alert

From 0545 hours (ZuLu), 26 June 1965 until 1245 hours (ZuLu), 5 July 1966, the 6^th Battalion, 56^th Artillery (HAWK) defense acquisition radar was placed on surveillance and all firing batteries were raised to a five-minute state of alert (STATE 1). All battery acquisition radars were also put on surveillance. A firing section of each unit was periodically released to a one-hour state of alert (STATE III) in order to allow essential maintenance service to be performed. Each unit received a cumulative total of 3 hours STATE III time, resulting in a battalion total of 12 hours STATE III time during the aforementioned period. The 6^th Battalion, 56^th Artillery (HAWK) experienced on battery non-operational time or loss of communication with higher or subordinate headquarters during this time. Overall 6^th Battalion, 56^th Artillery (HAWK) operational capability during this period is reflected by the 20,430.36 hours the 6^th Battalion, 56^th Artillery (HAWK) was operational out of 20,818.16 possible hours (98.1%). Operational Report on Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6^th Battalion, 56^th Artillery for Quarterly period Ending 31 July 1966 - Confident

MIG Type Aircraft Increased

During the reporting period, MIG type aircraft available to NVA have increased from approximately 100 on 31 October 1 966 to 129.30 1 January 1967. In addition, the number of air bases capable of handling jet aircraft has been increased. These bases can now accommodate approximately 230 aircraft. The 7^th Air Force estimates that the enemy capability remains approximately the same; however, the continuing increase in free world horses deployed in RVN and the increasing logistic complexes continually present more vulnerable targets should a hostile air attack be attempted. Intelligence Activities, Operational Report on Lessons Learned, HQ, 97^th Artillery Group (AD) for Quarterly period Ending 31 January 1967 – Secret

Enemy Air Threat Marginal

The enemy air threat remains marginal. However, the capability to mount harassing attacks is still a real consideration. During the period 6 December 1967 through 14 December 1967 several penetrations of the South Vietnamese border, from Cambodia, were made by unknown aircraft. This penetration may have been attempts to evaluate US detection and reaction capabilities against high performance aircraft. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 97th Artillery Group (AD), Period Ending 31 January 1968, Secret

The maximum combat operational radius for each type aircraft (optimum mode for air defense; NATO mode for ground support chart

·         The North Vietnamese had no known aerial refueling capability

General Giap's Suicide Mission
During the battle of Khe Sanh, 1968 General Vo Nguten Giap was pondering and perhaps plotting new surprises. To preclude one such possibility, intelligence officers spread the warning among U.S. bases that North Vietnamese MIG-21s may strike Khe Sanh or other places in I Corps and that Hanoi might even try to send its handful of Russian IL-28 jet bombers as far south as Saigon. For several months, General Vo Nguten Giap is known to have been considering the use of warplanes in the south. Despite the huge array of U.S. radar, HAWK missiles and interceptors stationed to defeat any such attempt, the experts feel that suicide missions or low-flying intruders might just succeed in dropping their bombs. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January-June 1965, Document 342 

The Deterrence Factor, 6^th Battalion, 56^th Artillery (HAWK) Vietnam

“To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting” –Sun Tzu, the Art of War

“When deterrence became a part of the United States' national strategy, U.S. Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) was key and essential to that effort. Was it successful? Measured by the number of attacks on the United States by the Soviets in the 24 years of ARADCOM's existence, it was 100 percent so”. Vigilant and Invincible by Colonel Stephen P. Moeller

The men of the 6^th Battalion, 56^th Artillery (HAWK) in locations in Vietnam - Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Long Bien, Chu Lia, or Landing Zone Oasis stood ready to defend their assigned air bases, fuel and ammo dumps, cities, major troop concentrations areas and free world ports in the Republic of South Vietnam.

Once the enemy’s aircraft was locked on by the HAWK battalion’s radars, they turned tail and departed our air defense zone. So I ask you? Was the 6^th Battalion, 56^th Artillery (HAWK) successful in Vietnam? Measure by the number of air attacks on South Vietnam.

Air Defense of the Republic of Vietnam

Air defense of the Republic of Vietnam against a hostile air attack was the responsibility of the Commander, 7^th Air Force, who was designated the Commander of the Mainland Southeast Asia Air Defense Region. The Commander was directly responsible to Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF).

To accomplish the air defense mission, he was given operational control over an mlti-service force of fighters interceptors and surface-to-air missiles, which were control through the radar agencies of the Tactical Air Control System (TACS). The fighter force consisted of F-102s deployed from Clark Air Base, Philippines, and a member of 1^st Marine Air Wing (MAW) F-4Bs, augmented with forces drawn from tactical fighter units. The U.S. Army’s 6^th Battalion, 56^th Artillery, 6^th Battalion, 71^st Artillery and the Marines 1^st LAAM Battalion and 2^nd LAAM Battalion constituted the ground complement of this air defense system.

The Mission of the HAWK Battalion in the Republic of Vietnam

In order to understand the mission of the Hawk missile battalions in the Republic of Vietnam we must establish some basic parameters. The maximum slant range of the Basic HAWK missile was about 15 miles. And could engage targets up to height of 36,000 feet. The distance from Tan Son Nhut Air Base to Bien Hoa Air Base is approximately 23 km or 14.3 miles. The CWAR Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar was used to detect targets up to 43 miles out.

The speed of the IL-28 North Vietnamese Light Bomber was 560 miles per hour. The distance from Hanoi to Bien Hoa Air Base was approximately 699 miles and to Saigon approximate 712 miles.

The mission of the HAWK missile battalions was to detect targets via acquisition radars, which were capable of detecting hostile aircraft at sufficient range to support the maximum missile intercept capabilities.

The mission of engaging hostile close in pop-up aircraft was the Duster 40MM Gun, Quad 50s and Vulcan.

Integrated Air Defense System

The United States Air Force, Hawk missile battalions, Duster 40MM Gun, Quad 50s and Vulcan tied in to an integrated early warning air defense system gave the free world forces in the Republic of South Vietnam an air defense force in depth. The Dusters, Quad 50s and Vulcan being the last line of this defense.

The Body Bag

In the HAWK missile air defense business if you are eye to eye with a hostile aircraft, you are a body bag.

HAWK System radars used in Vietnam

PAR        AN/MPQ-35

CWAR    AN/MPQ-34

HPIR       AN/MPQ-33/39

ROR       AN/MPQ-37

PAR Pulse Acquisition Radar The pulse acquisition radar is a long range, high altitude search radar.

• AN/MPQ-35 (Basic Hawk)

The search radar used with the basic HAWK system, with a radar pulse power of 450 kW and a pulse length of 3 µs, a Pulse Repetition Frequency of 800 and 667 Hz alternately. The radar operates in the 1.25 to 1.35 GHz range. The antenna is a 6.7 m × 1.4 m (22 ft × 4.6 ft) elliptical reflector of open lattice construction, mounted on a small two-wheeled trailer. Rotation rate is 20 rpm, the BCC - Battery Control Central and the CWAR are synchronized by the PAR revolutions and the PAR system trigger.

• AN/MPQ-50 (Improved Hawk to Phase III)

Introduced with the I-HAWK system, the improved-PAR. The system introduces a digital MTI (Moving Target Indicator) that helps separate targets from ground clutter. It operates in the 500 to 1,000 MHz (C-band) frequency range with a peak operating power of 1,000 watts.

• Range (source Janes):
  • 104 km (65 mi) (high PRF) to 96 km (60 mi) (low PRF) versus 3 m² (32 sq ft) target.
  • 98 km (61 mi)(high PRF) to 90 km (56 mi) (low PRF) versus 2.4 m² (26 sq ft) target.
  • 79 km (49 mi) (high PRF) to 72 km (45 mi) (low PRF) versus 1 m² (11 sq ft) target.

CWAR Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar This X Band Continuous wave system is used to detect targets. The unit comes mounted on its own mobile trailer. The unit acquires targets through 360 degrees of azimuth while providing target radial speed and raw range data.

• AN/MPQ-34 (Basic Hawk)

MPQ-34 Hawk CW Acquisition radar with a power rating of 200 W and a frequency of 10 GHz (X-Band) Built by Raytheon. Replaced by MPQ-48.

• AN/MPQ-48 (Improved Hawk)

The Improved Hawk version of the CW acquisition radar doubled the output power and improved the detection ranges:

• Range (source Janes):
  • 69 km (43 mi) (CW) to 63 km (39 mi) (FM) versus 3 m² (32 sq ft) target.
  • 65 km (40 mi) (CW) to 60 km (37 mi) (FM) versus 2.4 m² (26 sq ft) target.
  • 52 km (32 mi) (CW) to 48 km (30 mi) (FM) versus 1 m² (11 sq ft) target.

 HPIR High Power Illuminating Radar The early AN/MPQ-46 High Power Illuminator (HPIR) radars had only the two large dish-type antennas side by side, one to transmit and one to receive. The HPIR automatically acquires and tracks designated targets in azimuth, elevation and range. It also serves as an interface unit supplying azimuth and elevation launch angles computed by the Automatic Data Processor (ADP) in the Information Coordination Centre (ICC) to the IBCC or the Improved Platoon Command Post (IPCP) for up to three launchers. The HPIR J-band energy reflected from the target is also received by the HAWK missile. These returns are compared with the missile reference signal being transmitted directly to the missile by the HPIR. Target tracking is continued throughout the missile's flight. After the missile intercepts the target the HPIR Doppler data is used for kill evaluation. The HPIR receives target designations from one or both surveillance radars via the Battery Control Centre (BCC) and automatically searches a given sector for a rapid target lock on. The HPIR incorporates ECCM and BITE.

• AN/MPQ-33/39 (Basic Hawk)

This X Band CW System is used to illuminate targets in the Hawk Missile Battery. The unit comes mounted on its own mobile trailer. Unit automatically acquires and tracks designated targets in azimuth elevation and range rate. The system has an output power of around 125 W operating in the 10-10.25 GHz band. MPQ-39 was an upgraded version of the MPQ-33.

• AN/MPQ-46 (Improved Hawk - Phase I)

The radar operates in the 10-20 GHz (J-band) region. Many of the electron tube components in earlier radars are replaced with solid-state technology.

• Range (source Janes):
  • 99 km (62 mi) (high PRF) to 93 km (58 mi) (low PRF) versus 3 m² (32 sq ft) target.
  • 93 km (58 mi) (high PRF) to 89 km (55 mi) (low PRF) versus 2.4 m² (26 sq ft) target.
  • 75 km (47 mi) (high PRF) to 72 km (45 mi) (low PRF) versus 1 m² (11 sq ft) target.

ROR Range Only Radar Pulse radar that automatically comes into operation if the HPIR radar cannot determine the range, typically because of jamming. The ROR is difficult to jam because it operates only briefly during the engagement, and only in the presence of jamming.

• AN/MPQ-37 (Basic Hawk)

• AN/MPQ-51 (Improved Hawk - Phase II)

A Ku Band (Freq: 15.5-17.5 GHz) pulse radar, the power output was 120 kW. Pulse length 0.6 µs at a pulse repetition frequency of 1600 Hz. Antenna: 4-foot (1.2 m) dish.

• Range
  • 83 km (52 mi) versus 3 m² (32 sq ft) target.
  • 78 km (48 mi) versus 2.4 m² (26 sq ft) target.
  • 63 km (39 mi) versus 1 m² (11 sq ft) target.